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Disinflation programs in chronic  inflation countries do  not
normally follow the usual Phillips curve tradeoff in the medium
run.  Instead of having a sharp recession in the early stage of
stabilization, there often is an initial expansion of output fol-
lowed by a recession and balance of payments difficulties. This
pattern is related to programs that use the exchange rate as an
instrument of disinflation.
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This  paper  deals  wit;  the  effects  of  disinflation  on economic  activity  in
"chronic  inflation"  countries  (to  use  a term  coined  by  Pazos (1972)).  By this
we  mean countries with a  long inflationary  history above the rates in
industrialized  countries,  where labor and capital  markets are adjusted  to
function  in the inflationary  environment.  Our sample  is  based  on a number  of
Latin  American  countries,  including  the  major  ones  and  on Israel.
Our main finding  is that stabilization  processes  in chronic  inflation
countries  do  not  normally  follow  the  usual  Phillips  curve  trade  off  in  the  medium
run.  Specifically,  stabilization  programs in  these countries are often
associated  with a business  cycle,  beginning  with a boom and ending  with a
recession. This  finding  relates  to the  programs  which  used the  exchange  rate
as the  main nominal  anchor,  to which  we shall  refer  as "exchange  rate  based
stabilization"  (ERBS). The  latter  was  in fact  the  dominant  type  among  programs
which  had  any  significant  impact  on  inflation  in  the  countries  in  question.  The
limited  evidence  on other  types  of stabilization  points  to the  usual  Phillips
curve  relationship.
The  purpose  of the  paper  is  to  document  the  main features  of  the  business
cycle  phenomenon  in ERBSs,  to try  to understand  its  causes  and to derive  some
policy  implications  for  future  stabilizations  of  this  type.
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  We shall  first  try  to  obtain  a  better
perspective  for our  study by  referring  briefly to relevant features  of
stabilizations  in industrial  low-inflation  economies  and in hyperinflationary
episodes.  We then turn to chronic inflation  countries.  After a brief
description  of our  sample  of stabilization  programs  we shall  highlight  the  main
stylized  facts  concerning  the  business  cycles  in  these  experiences.  We shall2
t'en discuss the differences,  in theory and practice,  between ERBSs and
disinflation  programs  which  use  money  as the  nominal  anchor  (to  which  we shall
refer as "money  based stabilizations'  - MBS).  This will be followed  by an
attempt  to explain  the  mechanisms  which generated  the  business  cycle  in our
sample  of stabilization  programs. The  analysis  will examine  the  factors  which
contributed  to the  booms  on one  hand  and  to the  severity  of the  recessions  on
the  other. We conclude  with  issLes  related  to  the  countercyclical  policies.
I.  Stopping  Low  Inflation,  Hyperinflation  and  Chronic  Inflation
Stabilization  programs  which  are  aimed  at stopping  inflation  are  usually
conceived  as involving  an initial  cost in terms  of loss  of output  because  of
rigidities  in past  nominal  contracts  [as  in Fischer  (1988)  and  Taylor  (1979)]
or because  of credibility  problems. The costs  of disinflation  are therefore
borne  in  its  early  stage,  falling  later  as  the  link  with  the  past  is  severed  and
credibility  is  restored.
This "classical  scenario',  of an initial  recession  preceding  resumption
of normal activity,  is indeed  characteristic  of stopping  low or moderate
inflations  in  industrial  countries.  The  most  well  known  examples  of  recent  years
are the  stabilization  policies  in the  U.K. and the  U.S. in the  early  1980's.
This  pattern  is also  consistent  with the  process  of  disinflation  in  France  and
Italy  in  the  first  half  of the  eighties.
In the case of hyperinflations  one  may expect  that stabilization  costs
should  be relatively  small for several  reasons.  First, in this case the
rigidities  originating  from  past  nominal  contracts  become  negligible  because  of
the  drastic  shortening  of their  duration. Secondly,  the  credibility  problems,
which  usually  arise  even  when the fiscal  adjustment  is satisfactory,  are  also3
diminished  because  agents  realize  that  the  inflationary  process  is  explosive  and
after some point, and there is no alternative  to immediate  stabilization.
Thirdly,  in  hyperinflation  it is easy  to identify  the  change  of regime,  which
takes  the form  of stopping  the finance  of extremely  large  deficits  by money
creation. In view of latter  considerations  Sargent  (1983)  suggested,  in his
influential  paper,  that  in  these  cases  disinflation  costs  should  be  much lower
than,  say,  in  the  U.S.
Recent  research  suggests  that  the  recessionary  effects  of stabilization
in  hyperinflations  have  been  underestimated.  Thus  Wicker  (1986)  points  out  that
there  was a  significant  increase  in  unemployment  in  Poland,  Hungary  and  Austria
after  the  stabilization  of  hyperinflations  in  the  early  twenties. It took  two
to three  years  before  unemployment  returned  to  normal. The  reasons  seem  to  be
related,  in  part,  to  the  firing  of  public  sector  employees  (as  part  of  the  fiscal
adjustment)  and  to  the  process  of  adjustment  to  a  stable-price  environment.  Even
though  these recessionary  tendencies  may have been smaller  than in the low-
inflation  case,  the  classical  scenario  - of disinflation  being  followed  by
increase  in  unemployment  over  a  number  of  years  - continues  to  hold.
For most hyperinflationary  episodes  no  reliable data on  output is
available. The  scanty  evidence  shows  that  in some  cases  output  went through  a
growth  cycle  following  stabilization.  However  this  was  associated  with  extremely
low  prestabilization  levels  of output,  due to the  dislocations  caused  by wars
and  their  aftermath.
For  example,  industrial  output  increased  after  the  stabilization  of the
German  hyperinflation  in the  end  of 1923,  but this  followed  the  disruption  of
output  as a result  of events  associated  with  the  occupation  of the  Ruhr in  the
beginning  of that  year.  In  fact,  German  industrial  output  in  1924  was low  not4
only relative  to  the historical  level of 1913 but also relative  to the
prestabilization  years of 1921-22 [see data in Garber (1982)].  A  similar
phenomenon  is associated  with the Greek stabilization  of '945-47 [Makinen
(1987)].
One of the few cases  where a full fledged  hyperinflation  emerged in
peacetime  was the  recent  Bolivian  experience  of 1982-85. In  this  case  GDP  per
capita  fell  below  the  prestab!lization  level,  and  remained  there  at least  till
1989 (see Morales 1990), lending some support to the view that even in
hyperinflations  the stabilization  process  is associated  with a fairly long
initial  recessionary  phase  in  output.
Examining  stabilization  programs  in  chronic  inflation  countries  in  Latin
America,  we found,  as  noted  earlier,  in  most  cases  a rather  different .cenario.
After  a small  initial  recessionary  effect,  or  even  with  no effect  of this  kind,
the reduction  of inflation  was associated  withi  an initial  expansion  of output
above  the  historical  trend,  and  with  a drop  in  unemployment.  The  expansionary
phase  could  go on for  a  number  of years  ending  in a recession. It should  be
pointed  out,  however,  that  this  pattern  was  characteristic  of  programs  which  made
use  of the  exchange  rate  as anchor  for  disinflation  (this  category  covers  the
major  programs).
The  different  patterns  of  disinflation  in  chronic  inflation  countries  is
probably  related  in  part  to  the  use  of  the  exchange  rate  as  anchor. However  this
cannot  explain  the  emergence  of a demand-driven  business  cycle  unless  it comes
in conjunction  with such factors  as lack of credibility,  insufficient  fiscal
support  and  the  like (more  on this  later). The  highly  developed  technology  of
living  with inflation,  which  is  characteristic  of chronic  inflation  countries,5
is one  of the factors  which  make the  programs  less  credible. This is  because
stabilization  is  not  inevitable  (unlike  the  case  of  hyperinflations).
Another possible  reason for the cyclical  pattern is the tendency  of
governments  in chronic  inflation  countries  to use  improvements  in  the  external
sector in order to pursue simultaneously  expansionary  and disinflationary
policies.  This  tends  to  give  rise  to  an  unsustainable  boom  in  economic  activity.
The  emergence of  the  stabilization  cycles raises important issues
concerning  offsetting  policies.  The  fact  that  this  empirical  regularity  has  not
been  recognized  in the  past  led  to incorrect  evaluation  of actual  development.
For  example,  in  the  recent  Israeli  stabilization  policy  makers  interpreted  the
expansionary  phase  of  the  cycle  as  change  in  the  long  term  trend. As a result,
the  recessionary  phase  caught  policy  makers  by surprise. If  our findings  have
predictive  value for future  stabilizations  then appropriate  countercyclical
measures can be planned to mitigate the unfavorable  effect of excessive
variability  of output.
II.  EMPIRICAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF STABILIZATION  CYCLES
1.  The  Sample  of Stabilization  Programs
The stabilization  programs  in our analysis  refer  only to the so-called
"chronic  inflation  countries". The study  concentrates  on Latin  America  but
includes  also  Israel  whose  c.conomy  fits  the  chronic  inflation  category.  In  Latin
America  we deal  with stabilization  programs  undertaken  in Argentina,  Brazil,
Chile,  Uruguay  and  Mexico. In  each  of  these  countries  there  were  usually  a  large
number  of stabilization  programs,  but we include  oniy the "major"  ones (see
characteristics  of programs  in Table  1).  By this  we mean programs  which  the
public  recognized  as drastic  new initiatives  which constituted  a break  with6
previous  policies. A common  feature  of these  programs  is that  all  of  them  had
major effects on the economy (for better or worse) and brought about a
significant  reduction  in inflation  for  short  or long  time  spans. In  most  cases
the  programs  failed  to stabilize  inflation  eventually  (in  which  case  inflation
tended  to  accelerate)  but  in  other  cases  the  programs  were  part  of  a  longer  term
stabilization  effort  over  which  inflation  was  kept  at  a  low  level. (See  behavior
of  inflation  and  devaluation  in  all  programs  in  Figure  1. Programs  ave  indicated
by shaded  areas.)
To  gain  a  historic  perspective  of  the  stabilization  issue  we extended  our
empirical  analysis  over  a  period  covering  the  past  three  decades.  IT.  each  decade
there  was a group  of stabilization  programs  which  shared  some  impo.tant  common
elements  concerning  the  diagnosis  of inflation  and  the  design  of  the  appropriate
policies  to  deal  with it.
This  is  clearly  seen  in  the  stabilization  policies  of  1980's  which  include
Argentina's  Austral  plan of 1985-86,  the Brazilian  Cruzado  plan (1986),  the
Israeli  1985  plan  and  the  Mexican  Pact  of  Economic  Solidarityl  of  1988-89. All
these  programs  were  based  on  a shock  treatment  which  took  the  form  of  a drastic
stop  to  inflation  supported  by initial  wage-price  freezes.  These  programs  were
called  Heterodox  because  of the strong  income  policy  component,  but they  also
used  the  exchange  rate  as  a  nominal  anchor.  In  the  successful  experiments,  those
of Israel  and  Mexico,  the  exchange  rate  con,Lnued  to  be used  as the  stabilizing
instrument  even  when  prices  were  gradually  flexibilized  (Israel  has  been  using
step  devaluations  while  Mexico  adoptece  recently  a crawling  peg).
1  See  Heyman  (1987),  Kiguel  (1989),  Modiano (1988),  Bruno  and Piterman
(1988),  Liviatan  (1988),  Banco  de  Mexico  1988.7
Contrary  to the  approach  of the  eighties,  the  philosophy  of the  Southern
Cone Stabilization  (in Chile,  Argentina  and U uguay) in the 1970's  was an
"orthodox"  one,  i.e.  one  that  embraced  the  free  market  approach,  discredited  the
use  of  price  controls  and  favorea  the  liberalization  of  foreign  trade  and  capital
flows.  These  programs  shared  many common  elements  with regard  to design  and
phasing,  as aptly  described  by Ramos (1986). From the point  of view of the
present  paper  it is  especially  important  to  note  that  these  programs  evolved  in
two stages. The stage  of stopping  the accelerating  inflation  consisted  of a
fiscal-monetary  package  with  an  adaptable  exchange  rate  (which  -e  called  a  "money
based  stabilization"  or MBS),  while the  second  stage  was an ERBS.  The  latter
stage,  which  was  motivated  to some  extent  by the  slow  pace  of disinflation  in
the  preceding  one,  begen  in  Chile  in  the  second  semester  of  1976, 2 in  Argentina
in the second  semester  of 1978  and in Uruguay  in late 1978.  In the  advanced
stage of the ERBS these policies  took the form of a preannounced  path of
devaluations,  commonly  referred  to as the Tablita 3. As is  well known,  these
policies  ended  in a severe  crisis  in the  early  1980s  and  had tc  be abandoned.
Yet in  a  historical  perspective  the  Chilean  experience  turned  out  to  be a part
of a successful  long  term  disin.lationary  process.
In  our  sample  te  also  have  a group  of three  stabilization  programs  in  the
1960's  which  again  share  a number  of common  elements. Here  we refer  to the
Brazilian  1964-67  stabilization 4 under  the  Costello  Branco  administration,  the
2  In Chile, the  first phase was  a  crawling peg with occasional
revaluations.  In the  second  (more  advanced)  stage  the  exchange  rate  was fixed
in the  last  two  years  of the  Tablita  (Corbo  (1985),  p. 914).
3  On the  Southern  Cone  stabilizations,  see  Ramos  (1986),  Corbo  (1985)  and
Edwards  (1987).
4  See  Fishlow  (1973),  Simonsen  (  ),  Foxley  (1980)8
Krieger-Vasena stabilization  in  Argentina in  1967-705 and  the  Uruguay
stabilization  of 1968-716. In  all  of these  cases  the  basic  level  of inflation
was  much  lower  than  in  the  1980's  and  so  were  the  fiscal  deficits. The  programs
could  also  benefit  from  a growing  world  economy  and  trade. The  common  elements
were  expressed  by  the  fact  that  all  three  programs  male  use  of the  exchange  rate
as nominal  anchor  and used income-policies  in varying  degrees  of intensity.
(Argentina  and  Brazil  relied  mainly  on  voluntary  price  controls  in  contrast  to
Uruguay  which  adopted  a  heterodox  shock  treatment  with  comprehensive  wage-price
controls,  similar  to  those  of  the  eighties).  While  the  Argentinean  and  Uruguayan
programs  were not sustained  beyond  1970 and 1972  respectively,  the Brazilian
program  was  the  prelude  to  a  long  period  of  high  growth  with  low  inflation  (known
as the "Braziliar  Miracle") 7.
In  addition  to the  ten  programs  mentioned  above,  our  sample  includes  two
adlitional  Argentinean  stabilizations.  One is the Frondizi  stabilization  of
1959-62  which resembles  those  of the 1970's  in two respects,  namely  being  an
"orthodox"  program  and  having  initially  a stage  of tight  monetary  policy  (the
first  semester  of  1959)  that  changed  later  to  a  fixed  exchange  rate  policy  which
lasted  until early 1962.  We close the list of our sample  by the Peronist
stabilization  of 1973-75  (See  DiTella  (1979))  which  resembles  in some  ways the
Brazilian  Cruzado  plan.  Both  programs  used  comprehensive  wage-price-exchange-
rate freezes  which  were n  supported  by a proper  fiscal  adjustment  and are
usually  regarded  as  populist  policies.
5  De Pablo  (1974)
6  Finch  (1974),  Viana  (1989)
7  See  detailed  analysis  of these  programs  in  Kiguel  and  Liviatan  (1989).9
We turn  now  to  the  characterization  of  the  programs  in  terms  of  the  policy
instruments,  the  targets,  and  the  real  effects  with  which  they  were  associated.
2.  Exchange  Rate  and  Honey  Based  Stabilizations.
One of the  basic  features  of stabilization-business-cycles  is that  they
were  associated  with  programs  which  used  the  exchange  rate,  rather  than  the  money
supply  as the nominal anchor.  While it is easy to identify  the former
empirically,  the  latter  case  is  more  elusive.
One  piece  of  evidence  which  we used  for  the  comparison  of the  alternative
disinflation  strategies  is related  to the  stabilization  programs  initiated  in
the  Southern  Cone  by  the  military  governments  in  the  1970s.  As  we  noted  earlier,
the  first  stage  of disinflation  relied  mainly on  monetary  and fiscal  measures
which  were then  switched  to the  exchange  rate-fiscal  package  [see  Ramos  (1986)
and  Edwards  (1987)].
The result  of the first  phase  was recessionary  for  Chile  and  Argentina
both in comparison  with past  trends  and  in relation  with other  Latin  American
countries  (Table  1).  In  Uruguay  this  phase  was expansionary;  this  seems  to  be
related  to the fact that  here the  main priority  in stage  I was not to stop
inflation  but  rather  to  encourage  exports  by fiqnal  and  financial  means  (Ramos
op.  cit.,  p. 29)  which  may  have stimulated  output. Stage  II  was expansionary
in all three  coumtries  by the  above  criteria. The recessionary  phase  of this
policy (stage  III in the table)  coincided  with a recession  in other Latin
American  countries  as  a  result  of  worsening  external  conditions.  It  is  apparent
however  that  the failure  of the  Tablita  policies  in Chile  and  Uruguay,  where
these  wi._e  applied  more rigorously,  caused  a distinctly  excessive  recession.10
In  the  course  of stage  I  the  three  countries  managed  to  get  their  external
bal_ ce  under  control,  but  the  situation  deteriorated  severely  in stage  II (as
can  be seen  in  table  1).  Stage  III  represents  the  recession  which  accompanied
:he  balance  of payments  crisis  at the  termination  of the  Tablita  policies. 8
The  effects  of  the  nominal  policies  on  economic  activity  in  the  two  stages
are not fully  comparable  because  of two reasons.  First,  the major fiscal
adjustments  took place in stage  I and their recessionary  effects  cannot  be
separated  from Lhe  monetary  effects.  Secondly,  in stage  I the economies  in
question  had  to  deal  with  severe  balance  of  payments  problems  (especially  Chile,
which  had  to  adjust  to  a  sharp  fall  in  the  price  of  copper  in  late  1974). These
developments  may  have  biased  the  comparison  between  the  stages  in  the  direction
of showing  a too  large  recessionary  effect  in  MBS.  However,  we do  not  believe
that  this  changes  the  main  conclusion,  namely  that  MBS  tended  to  be recessionary
while  the  ERBS  tended  to  expansionary.
A  similar  distinction  between  stages  of  monetary  and  exchange  rate  based
policies  emerged  also  in  the  Frondizi  stabilization,  where  tight  monetary  policy
was  applied  in  the  first  half  of  1959  leading  to  a recession  and  an  improvement
in the  current  account  (see  figure  2).  In the  ERBS,  which  took  place  from  the
second  semester  of 1959,  output  expanded  above  the  historical  trend,  following
the  pattern  of the  seventies.
8  We must  note  that  there  was  no  close  resemblance  between  stage  I of  the
foregoing  stabilizations  and the classical  monetary  stabilization  based  on a
fixed  (low)  money  supply  rule  with  a floating  exchange  rate. In practice,  the
rates of monetary  growth  were reduced  in a very gradual  manner without a
preannounced  rule (unlike  the  exchange  rate  stabilization  phase). While  there
were some identifiable  instances  of tightening  monetary  policy, there was
certainly  no rigid  use  of  money  as  an anchor.11
3.  The  Main Feature  of ERBS's
a.  Real  activity
In  general,  economic  expansion  started  quite  soon  after  the  initiation  of
the  stabilization  programs  (see  Figures  2).  In  Argentina  the  growth  of output
is  evident  in  all  five  stabilizations.  In  Chile,  where  the  use  of  the  exchange
rate  for  stabilization  purchases  began  as early  as the  second  semester  of 1976
(see  Corbo  (1985))  we find  that  the  whole  period  of ERBS till  1982  was  one  of
uninterrupted  GDP  growth.  The  upsurge  of growth  is also  apparent  in  Uruguay
after  the stabilization  of the  exchange  rate in 1979.  The  exper.ence  of the
eighties  is  generally  quite  similar  in  this  respect. Israel  enjoyed  high  rates
of growth  in the  business  sector  in the first  three  years  of the  programs  and
similar,  though  shorter,  growth  spans  were  observed  in  the  Austral  and Cruzado
plans. Usually  the  behavior  of  the  unemployment  was  compatible  with  GDP  growth,
i.e.,  unemployment  fell  in  the  growth  phase  of  the  cycle  (we  do  not  record  here
this  evidence  for  the  sake  of  brevity).
We should  note  a  certain  difference  between  orthodox  and  heterodox  program
in the initial  stage  of the  ERBS.  In the orthodox  program  the exchange  rate
policy  was introduced  when inflation  was already  on the  decline,  having  been
stopped  initially  by a  monetary-fiscal  package  as in the  Frondizi  and  Southern
Cone stabilizations  of the 70s.  In these cases we  do not observe any
recessionary  effects  with the shift to a policy of reducing  the rate of
devaluation.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  heterodox  stabilizations  the  introduction
of the  ERBS  was in the  context  of stopping  the  inflationary  acceleration.  In
a  way,  the  income  policies  of  the  heterodox  programs  were  the  counterpart  of the
monetary  measures  which preceded  the ERBS in the orthodox  programs  of the
Southern  Cone.  This  brought  about  an initial  recessionary  effect  into  the12
heterodox  programs.  However,  as can be seen in Figure  2, the recessionary
effects  were both  small  and  short-lived.
When  the  period  of  exchange  rate  stabilization  extended  over  a  considereble
span  we observe  that the recessionary  phase started  before  the large  maxi-
devaluations  set  in.  This  was the  case  in the  Southern  Cone stabilizations  of
the  70s,  as  well  as in  Uruguay  1969  and  in  Israel.
In order  to obtain  a better  understanding  of the  cycle  it is useful  to
relate  it  to  the  long  term  trend.  Accordingly,  we  present  in  figure  3  the  cycles
in terms  of deviations  from  the  long  term  evolution  of GDP  per  capita. 9 These
diagrams  confirm  that  almost  all  of  the  cycles  can  be  characterized  as such  even
with respect  to  the  long  term  trend. In  this  respect  the  expansions  in  chronic
inflation  countries  differ  from those  which are sometimes  observed  in post-
hyperinflations,  as  in  the  case  of  Germany  where  industrial  output  remained  well
below  trend  (see  Garber  op.  cit.). It  may  be  pointed  out  that  while  the  cycles
may  have  influenced  the  trend,  as calculated  in  our  study,  this  interaction  was
minimized  by taking  relatively  long  time  intervals.
Note  also  that  most  of the  ERBS's  were  preceded  by a recessionary  period
relative  to trend. This  indicates  the  existence  of excess  capacity  which  may
have  provided  suitable  conditions,  from  the  supply  side,  for  the  upswing.
One  exception  deserves  special  attention.  The  Brazilian  stabilization  in  1964-
67  was  characterized  by a continuous  recession  relative  to trend. This  may  be
a significant  fact in explaining  the sustained  low  level  of inflation  in the
following ("miracle")  years.  We may  also note that the Krieger Vasena
9  To compute  the trend  we fitted  a linear  or quadratic  equation  for  log
GDP  per  capita  in  a  piecewise  manner  and  appropriate  intervals.  In  the  case  of
Argentina  there  is overlapping  in  the  periods  used  to  calculate  the  trend. We
then  averaged  the  residuals  from  the  overlapping  parts.13
stabilization,  which was one of the more successful  Argentinean  attempts,
maintained  GDP  below  trend  for  the  first  two  years  and  only  the  last  two  years
gave  way to the  boom.
b.  The  Balance  of payments
It is characteristic  of all ERBSs that they were associated  with a
deterioration  of  the  trade  balance  in  the  course  of the  program. Therefore  the
expansionary  feature  of  these  programs,  from  the  point  of  view  of  domestic  uses,
was  even  more  pronounced  than  with  the  output  growth  criterion.  The  normal  case
(see  figure  2) is  that  in  the  expansionary  phase  the  current  account  goes into
the red.  The capital  inflows  which financed  these  deficits  were, as a rule,
reversed  at some  advanced  stage  of the  boom  where  the  recessionary  phase  began
It  was  the  inability  to  finance  the  growing  current  account  deficits  which
was, in  most  cases,  the immediate  reason  for  halting  the  boom.  There  are two
important  exceptions,  in  different  directions,  to  this  statement. In the  case
of Brazil  1964-67  the  capital  inflows  continued  to finance  the  current  account
deficit  and  made  growth  sustainable  for  many  years  to  come. On the  other  hand,
in  the  case  of  Israel  the  boom  was  halted  without  a  deterioration  of  the  current
account.
c.  Relative  prices
As  a rule,  real  wages  increased  with  the  upswing  of  economic  activity  (see
figure  4),  but  sometimes  we observe  a lag  which  is  due  to  two  reasons. The  real
wage  may  have  been raised  up front  in  order  to take  account  of the  anticipated
erosion  by the sluggish  reduction  in inflation. We then observe  a temporary
reduction  in  the  real  wage  in  the  early  phase  of stabilization  (as  was the  case14
in  the  Krieger  Vasena  stabilization).  Or it  may  be the  case  that  the  real  wage
was kept deliberately,  for some time,  below  its equilibrium  level  by income
policies  (as  was the  case  in  Israel).
The normal  behavior  of the real exchange  rate  during  the  boom was (as
expected)  in  the  opposite  direction  to  that  of  the  real  wage.  It is  especially
during  the  periods  of the  full  peg  that  the  real  exchange  rate  fell  quickly.
d.  Consumption  and  investment
Most  of  the  expansions  of  output  were  accompanied  by  a "consumption  boom".
Clearly,  when  GDP  grows  faster  we also  expect  consumption  to follow  suit. The
latter  is expected  to lag  behind  output  if the stimulus  to growth  does not
originate  from the consumption  side.  By a 'consumption  boom'  we mean that
consumption  grows faster  than GDP when the latter  accelerates  (or is above
normal). The  most conspicuous  episodes  of the  consumption  boom  took  place  in
the  Peronist  and  Martinez  de Hoz  stabilizations  in  Argentina,  Uruguay  1969  and
the  Israeli  program  (figure  5).
Investment  played a dominant  role in the Argentinean  program of the
sixties,  much of it being directly  induced  by government  policies.  In the
programs  of the seventies  it was the Chilean  ERBS which was driven  by a
continuous  investment  boom.  The  role  of investment  was not  significant  in  the
eighties.  This  was  partly  related  to  the  reduction  in  capital  inflows  following
the  debt  crisis. In  Israel  we observe  a short-lived  upsurge  in investment,  but
on the  whole  the  investment-GDP  ratio  was lower  after  the stabilization.15
e.  The  fiscal  deficit
Normally  the  stabilization  cycle  appears  in  spite  of  a sharp  reduction  in
the  fiscal  deficit  (see  figures  1). This  is  perhaps  most  clearly  evident  in  the
case  of  Israel  where  the  elimination  of  the  fiscal  deficit  in  1986  coincided  with
a sharp  consumption  boom.  This  may seem  rather  surprising  since  the  increase
in  taxation  clearly  outweighed  any  possible  reduction  in the  inflation  tax. A
similar  phenomenon  was  observed  in  Chile  where  the  fiscal  deficit  was  turned  into
a surplus  in the  course  of the  ERBS.  The  cut  in the  fiscal  deficit  prior  to,
or along  with, the expansion  in aggregate  demand  during  the early phase  of
stabilization  is  also  characteristic  of all  Argentine  programs  (except  for  the
Peronist  one where the deficit increased  from the start).  Although the
recessionary  phase  of the  cycle involved  typically  an increase  in the fiscal
deficit  yet if  this  increase  was  perceived  as  being  endogenous  to the  recession
it  did  not  entail  the  rekindling  of  inflationary  expectations  (see  Figures  9  and
12 for  Chile  and  Israel).
III.  THEORETICAL  ASPECTS  OF  THE  EXPANSIONARY  PHASE
The  questions  which  are raised  by the foregoing  stylized  facts  are the
following: What is the  explanation  of the  clear  tendency  of the  ERBSs  to be
expansionary?  What  explains  the  contrast  between  these  stabilizations  and  those
based  on money  as the  anchor,  which turned  out to be recessionary? Is ERBS
expansionary  because  it  is  correlated  with  other  policies  which  are  expansionary?
Or is it because ERBSs are correlated  with external  conditions  which are
conducive  to  expansion?  We shall  first  deal  with  these  questions  before  turning
to the  issues  which  relate  the  recessionary  phase  with the  balance  of payments
crises. Let  us begin  with some  theoretical  considerations.16
1.  Disinflation  Under  Alternative  Regimes  With Flexible  Prices
In the theoretical  models of ERBSs we assume that the central  bank
stabilizes  the  exchange  rate  by  intervening  in  the  foreign  exchange  market,  i.e.
by manipulating  its international  reserves. This is not allowed  iis  the  MBS,
where  the  exchange  is  floating.  Now  is  there  any  reason  to  expect  that  in  theory
an ERBS  will have initial  expansionary  effects  on consumption? Let us first
consider  this  question  in  the  context  of  flexible  prices. In  addition,  in  order
to focus  solely  on the exchange  rate  policy  let us abstract  from  the fiscal
aspect, assuming that taxes are lump sum and fully accommodative  to the
disinflation  policy 10. This  in line  with  the  approach  taken  by  Obstfeld  (1985)
and  Calvo (1986)  who analyze  disinflation  by means  of exchange  rate  policy  in
a  Ricardian  model. This  analysis  assumes  that  the  central  bank's  operations  are
fully  internalized  by the  private  sector.
Obstfeld shows that in this framework a  reduction in the rate of
devaluation  from one constant  level to another is neutral  with respect  to
consumption  and the current account.  Real money balances  will increase
immediately  through  a sale of foreign  assets  to the central  bank, but the
increase  in central  bank's  reserves  will not  affect  consumption  possibilities
since  the  real  asset  position  of the  economy  as a  whole  did  not  change.
It  may  be  noted  that  if  we  use  this  model  to  perform  a  similar  disinflation
by means  of reducing  the  rate  of growth  of the  money  supply  we will  obtain  the
same  kind  of result. The  economy  can  jump  immediately  from  a  high inflation  to
10  In a  Ricardian  model  it is  only  the  discounted  value  of the  stream  of
taxes  that  matters.17
a low  inflation  steady  state  in  a  neutral  fashion  with  real  balances  increasing
through  our  initial  drop  in  prices.
In  non-Ricardian  models  of finite  horizon  (unlike  the  foregoing  models  of
infinite  horizon)  the  results  may  be quite  different. Thus,  Helpman  and  Razin
(1987)  show that in the context  of an overlapping  generations  model of the
Blanchard  (1985)  type,  the  consequences  of exchange  rate  management  are  likely
to be different  as compared  with a pure float.  In their  model,  variation  in
taxation  will  be neutral  (as  in  the  Ricardian  model)  under  a  pure float,  while
under exchange  rate management  this will not necessarily  be the case. In
particular,  an unexpected  freeze  of the  exchange  rate  combined  with a tax  cut
may  be expansionary.  This  will  happen  if  the  freeze  creates  a  windfall  for  the
currently  living  generation,  which  is  not fully  taxed  away.  While  this  model
is based  on very special  assumptions  (e.g.  money is  not a store  of value,  so
that portfolio considerations  are  ruled out) it  does suggest that the
disinflation  under  the  two  types  of regimes  may indeed  be  basically  different.
It  should  be  pointed  out,  however,  that  this  model  does  not  provide  a  convincing
explanation  for the  experiences  of Israel  where  the  consumption  boom arose  in
conjunction  with  a  fiscal  surplus.  It  may  provide  however  a  possible  explanation
for  consumption  booms  which  appeared  in  programs  where  the  fiscal  adjustment  was
not  sufficient  to sustain  the  devaluation  policy  on a long  term  basis.
2.  Inertial  Wage  and  Price  Rigidities
Wage  or  price  rigidities  may  provide  another  setting  in  which  disinflation
under  alternative  regimes  may  yield  differences  in the  direction  suggested  by
the  stylized  facts. For  example,  we  can  see  intuitively  that  when  prices  exhibit
downward  rigidity  the increase  in real  money  balances  in the  MBS cannot  take18
place through  a fall in prices  and therefore  it is output  that  will tend  to
fall. 11 This factor  does not exist in an ERBS  where the downward  rigidity
constraint  is not  binding. Although  this  argument  does  not  explain  why there
is a tendency  for ERBS to be expansionary,  it shows that the MBS is more
recessionary.
In  pursuing  this  approach  we can  make  use  of recent  theoretical  studies
by Fischer [(1986)  and (1988)]  who analyzed  the effects  of disinflation  in
alternative  exchange  rate  regimes  under  wage rigidities  which  result  from  long
term  nominal  contracts.  Fischer  formulates  a fairly  standard  macro  model  of  the
open  economy  with  rational  expectations  and  full  capital  mobility  (the  interest
rate  parity  holds),  a downward  sloping  demand  curve  for exports  and a 'small
economy'  assumption  with regard  to imports. The longeEt  wage contract  is for
two periods  in the course  of which a successful  disinflation  assumed  to be
completed.
Disinflation  by  means  of the  money  supply  tends  to generate  recessionary
influences  through  an  increase  in  real  wages  due  to  nominal  wage  rigidity  (which
reduces  supply)  and  through  the  creation  of  excess  demand  for  money  which  pushes
up  the  real  interest  rate  and  thup  reduces  aggregate  demand. An increase  in  the
real  interest  rate  above  the  international  level,  under  perfect  capital  mobility,
is possible  only if a real  devaluation  is  expected,  which  in turn  requires  an
initial  real  appreciation,  since  the  real  exchange  rate  has  to return  eventually
to its original  level (as in Dornbusch's  overshooting  theory).  This real
appreciation  exerts  an  additional  recessionary  effect  through  the  demand  for
llThis  is  in  fact  confirmed  in  a  recent  model  by  Calvo  and  Vegh  (1990)  where
(symmetrical)  nominal  rigidity  is  introduced  through  a  model  of  staggered  prires.19
domestic  output. The  effect  on the  trade  balance  is ambiguous  because  of the
conflicting  i;fluences  of the  reduction  in output  and  the  real  appreciation.
In comparing  these  conclusions  with the 'monetary  phase'  of the  Southern
Cone stabilizations  (as  well as with other  monetary-fiscal  stabilizations  in
Latin  America)  we find  indeed  that the  overall  effect  is r.Bcessionary,  but  we
do  not  find  the  tendency  for  real  appreciation. 1 2 We also  find  that  the  effect
of  the  MBS  on  the  trade  balance  was  favorable.  A  possible  explanation  for  these
contradictions  is that the periods in which this type of stabilization  was
undertaken  in the Southern  Cone were ones of much political  and economic
instability  which  prevented  effective  capital  inflows.  In  the  absence  of  capital
flows  (such  that  the current  account  is a residual  accommodated  by changes  in
reserves)  a tight  money  policy  can  be consistent  with a real  depreciation  and
an  improvement  in  the  current  account  if  the  exchange  rate  policy  is  of  the  form
of a passive  crawling  peg (with  lags).
For  the  case  of an  EkBS in Fischer's  type  of analysis,  the  recessionary
effe :  through  excess  demand  for  money  is essentially  inoperative  since  money
is endogenous. However  the  real  appreciation  is still  there  because  domestic
prices  are stickier  than  the  exchange  rate  at the starting  point. Real  wages
for  domestic  producers  can  also  be  expected  to go  up because  nominal  wages  are
stickier  than  prices. In  contrast  to  th.se  recessionary  tendencies  there  is  an
initial  expansionary  effect  through  the  possible  reduction  in  the  real  interest
rate  in the  first  period. This  is due  to the  real  appreciation  in the  second
period,  which  is foreseen  correctly  in the  first  one.  Given  the  interest  rate
parity  this implies  a reduction  in the real interest  rate.  In spite  of the
12  In the case of Argentina  the economy  started  with an undervalued
currency,  which  may  explain  lack  of further  real  depreciation  in  1976.20
theoretical  possibility  of a boom in the  first  period,  Fischer  dismisses  this
outcome  as  unlikely  on  the  basis  of some  numerical  examples.  The  effect  of  ERBS
on the  trade  balance  is again  ambiguous  because  of opposing  forces.
Fischer's  results  concerning  the  real  appreciation  ard the implied  rise
in real wages in an ERBS are certainly  consistent  with the stylized  facts
presented  earlier.  However,  in the real-world  ERBSs,  there is clearly  no
ambiguity  about  the deterioration  of the trade  account  in the course  of the
stabilizations.  More importantly,  the  early  part  of these  stabilizations  is
almost  always  expansionary,  contrary  to  Fischer's  examples. If  we remain  in  the
context  of  his  model 13 we  have  to  conclude  that  the  initial  expansionary  effect
of the real interest  rate outweighs  the recessionary  effect of the real
appreciation.
3.  More  on the  Expansionary  Effect  of the  Real  Interest  Rate
The  possibility  that  the  real  interest  rate  may  create  a  boom  in  the  ERBS
comes  out  nore clearly  in the  model  developed  by Rodriguez  (1982). This  model
is based  directly  on rigidities  in inflationary  expectations  in the  sector  of
non-tridables. With full  capital  mobility  the formula  for  the real  interest
(r)  rate  is  given  by
r  =i  e= i+  B(ee  _  e) +  k  (1)
13 We should  also  note  that  the  actual  programs  are  not  directly  comparable
with  the  model  because  the  latter  assumes  that  stabilization  is  successful,  which
is usually  not  the  case  in  practice.21
where i is the nominal  domestic  interest  rate,  ire  is the expected  rate of
inflation,  i* the  foreign  interest  rate,  3  the  weight  of non-tradables  in the
e  e price  index,  e  the  expected  rate  of devaluation,  N the  expected  rate  of
inflation  in  non-tradables  and  k is  a constant  risk  factor.
Rodriguez  assumes  that  actual  devaluation  e  equals  fe and  that
e  exhibits  rigidity. It then  follows  that  a reduction  in  E  will  reduce  r and
thus  cause  an  expansion  of  aggregate  demand. In  the  framework  of  continuous  time
the  level  of  the  real  exchange  will  not  change  on  impact  while  r  will. Therefore
the  initial  effect  of an  ERBS is  expansionary.  The  recessionary  effect  of the
real  appreciation  on the demand  for  non-tradables  gathers  strength  gradually
and eventually  outweighs  the expansionary  effect  of the real interest  rate.
Eventually  the real exchange  and interest  rates return  to their long-run
equilibrium  levels.
While  in the  Rodriguez  model  aggregate  output  is assumed  to be constant
we may,  in  principle,  think  that  domestic  output  depends  negatively  on  the  real
interest  rate  and  positively  on  the  real  exchange  rate. In  this  modified  version
there  will be an output  cycle,  with an initial  boom,  and  a real  exchange  rate
cycle  with  an initial  appreciation.
The foregoing  model  can  be criticized  on several  grounds. First,  it  can
be claimed  that this  model,  as well  as Fischer's,  assumes  full  credibility  in
the  government's  devaluation  policy,  which  is  unrealistic.  We  must  distinguish,
however,  between  credibility  in the  early  and  later  stages. The fact  is that
the  announcement  of a reduction  of the  rate  of devaluation  is  usually  credible
in  the  short  run,  and  this  is strengthened  by capital  inflows  which  augment  the22
central  bank's  reserves.  This  is  sufficient  to  create  an  expenditure  boom. The
issue  of credibility  in the  announced  devaluation  rate  appears  later,  and  we
shall  deal  with it  subsequently.
Another  criticism  is that the  model is based  on adaptive  expectations
which  are  not  very  fashionable  recently.  However,  one  can  show  that  the  insight
provided by  Rodriguez concerning  the boom can be  preserved in rational
expectations  models  of similar  kind.
What is  the  empirical  evidence  on the  behavior  of real  interest  rates  in
ERBSs?  It seems  that in the  case of the  Southern  Cone stabilizations  in the
late  70s  the  reduction  in  the  real  interest  rates  was  quite  evident.  Thus,  Corbo
(1985)  reports  that the Tablita  policy  in Chile,  and the increased  capital
mobility  with  which it  was associated,  led  to a downward  pressure  on domestic
interest  rates  which stimulated  a rise  in aggregate  demand. Similar  findings
for  the early  stage  of the Tablita  policies  are reported  in Ramos (1986)  for
lending  rates 14 in  all  Southern  Cone  experiments  (see  table  3).  However,  this
property  was  not  shared  by  the  stabilization  programs  in  the  1980s  partly  because
of limited  capital  flows  as a result  of the  debt  crisis. Real interest  rates
in Israel and Mexico  rose to  extremely high  levels in  the  course of
stabilization.  This  may  be related  to the  lower  degree  of  credibility  in  these
programs  due  to the  sharp  reduction  of  inflation  with  the  aid  of controls. The
rise  in the  ex-ante  real rates  was smaller  but apparently  still  significant.
It seems  therefore  that  in  these  cases  we  need  something  more  than  the  Rodriguez
mechanism  to explain  the expansion.  The next section  explores  one of the
possibilities.
14 The  picture  for  deposit  rates  is  less  clear,  see  Ramos  op.cit.,  p.  154.23
4.  Temporariness
The  foregoing  models  of Fischer  and  Rodriguez  assume  that  the  program  is
eventually  successful.  However,  the fact  that so  many stabilization  programs
failed  must lead to pessimistic  views  about the  chances  of a new program  to
succeed. This  is equally  true  for  a program  which  turns  out  eventually  to be
part  of  a successful  disinflation,  as in  the  case  of Chile  or  Israel. However,
the  very  expectation  that  the  stabilization  is  only  temporary  may  give  rise,  in
the  early  stages,  to  an expansion  of aggregate  demand.
The  issue of expectations  that stabilization  is temporary  has been
investigated  in various  recent  papers  by Calvo (1986,  1987,  1989).  In these
models,  which are  based  on a cash in advance  setting,  it is shown  that  when
agents  expect  stabilization  to  be  temporary  they  will  shift  part  of their  future
consumption  expenditures  to  the  present.  The  reason  is  that  in  the  present,  when
the  rates  of  devaluation  and  inflation  are  low,  the  cost  of  holding  money  (which
is  necessary  to carry  out  expenditures)  is  also  low,  while  the  opposite  is  true
for  the  future  periods  when  inflation  is  expected  to  be  resumed.  This  will  give
rise to increased  expenditures  in the stabilization  period,  accompanied  by
current  account  deficits  and  real  appreciation.  All these  features  are  clearly
consistent  with  the phenomenon  of the consumption  boom and the  related
developments  which  we described  earlier.
It is interesting  to  note that this  model is a Ricardian  one,  with the
property  that a permanent  reduction  in the (constant)  rate  of devaluation  is
neutral.  This  underscores  the  fact  that  the  consumption  boom  is  related  entirely
to  expectations  of  temporariness.  It  may  also  be  noted  that  unlike  the  Rodriguez24
and  Fischer  models,  where  the  boom  is  the  result  of  an initial  reduction  in  the
real interest  rate,  the rise in consumption  in Calvo's  model is caused  by a
temporary  reduction  in the  nominal  interest  rate.  This helps  to explain  the
emergence  of the  consumption  boom  in  programs  where  the  real  interest  was  very
high (as  in the  case  of israel).
We may  also  point  out that  with fully  flexible  prices,  the  Calvo  (1986)
model  of temporary  stabilization  will lead  to an early  consumption  boom even
under  a  MBS.15 However  this  requires  an initial  drop  in  prices. Consequently,
with  downward  price  rigidity  the  expansionary  effect  may  not  be  possible. This
problem does not arise with an ERBS since nominal money is endogenous.
Consequently  the  expansionary  effe_.  remains. 16
Somewhat  paradoxically,  one  can  arrive  at  similar  conclusions  with  regard
to  the  consumption  boom  if  one  assumes  that  (a)  consumers  view  the  stabilization
as permanent,  and (b)  that the reduced  uncertainty  about relative  prices  and
about  government  policies  will  enhance  productivity.  This  sort  of  expectations
may  raise  the  perceived  permanent  income  and  thus  raise  consumption. (Note,
however, that on this interpretation  the increase in consumption  is not
cyclical.)
A partial  test  for  the  competing  hypotheses  is  by looking  at the  behavior
of  durable  goods  purchases.  If  agents  expect  the  stabilization  to  fail  then  they
may  consider  the  possibility  that  the  failure  will  involve  a  balance  of  payments
crisis  which  will  be accompanied  by quantitative  restrictions  on imports  and  a
15 This  is  shown  by  Calvo  (1989)  in  the  framework  of  a  more  general  model.
16In  a  more  recent  paper  Calvo  and  Vegh  (op.  cit.)  show  that  with  staggered
prices  an ERBS is expansionary  while  a HBS is recessionary  in the  context  of
temporary  stabilization.25
general  tightening  of  credit  conditions.  They  would  therefore  shift  the  purchase
date  of durables  to  the  prtsent. A perceived  increase  in  permanent  income  may
also give rise to a more-than-proportionate  increase  in durables  purchases,
because  of  the  accelerator  effect,  but  this  can  be  expected  to  be  lower  than  the
intertemporal  substitution  effect.
An examination  of tho data for Israel  reveals  that durable  purchases
increased  tremendously  in  1986,  following  the  stabilization  of  July  1985 (Table
4)  which  lends  some  support  to  the  temporariness  hypothesis.  It is  interesting
to  note  that  a  similar  behavior  was  recorded  in  Israel  in  1981-83  when  the  prices
of durables  were reduced  temporarily  through  cuts  in sales  taxes  and  through  a
reduction  in the  rate  of  devaluation  (in  the  Tablita  fashion).
5.  Consumption  Booms  and  Self  Fulfilling  Balance  of Payments
Crises
The  foregoing  discussion  can  be related  to  the  theory  of rational  and
self-fulfilling  balance  of  payments  crisis,  as in  Obstfeld  (1986). Pessimistic
views  about  the  government's  policy  in  the  event  of  a crisis  may  actually  bring
it  about  even  if it  is  completely  unrelated  to  the  behavior  of  the  fundamentals
under  full  credibility. In particular,  if the  public's  perception  is that an
exchange  rate  collapse  will  set  off  an  inflationary  domestic  credit  policy  (which
is  not  unrealistic)  then  the  crisis  may  become  self-fulfilling.
If agents expect that a balance of payments  crisis  will involve
restrictions  on  expenditures,  in  the  fashion described above, then the
anticipated  self-fulfilling  crisis  may  be  preceded  by  a  consumption  boom. This
consideration  provides another possible link between confidence in  the
government's  commitment  to  disinflate  and  preemptive  increases  in  expenditures.26
6.  Real  Wages  as a Cause  for  Expansion
Since  real  wages  tend  to  rise  with  the  expenditure  cycle  it  is  conceivable
that  the  former  may actually  cause  the latter. This is  because  of the  higher
propensity  to spend  out  of  wage income. However,  this  theory  has to  deal  with
two  questions.  First,  it  has  to  show  that  real  wages  affect  demand  more  strongly
than  supply. Secondly,  it  has to  explain  what is it that  causes  wages  to rise
in ERBS  more  than  otherwise.
The  answer  to  the  first  question  is  certainly  unclear  from  the  theoretical
point  of view. 17 As for  the  second  one, it is often  mentioned  (especially  in
the  case  of the  Chilean  Tablita)  that  lagged  wage indexation  will  cause  a rise
in  real  wages  when  inflation  is  falling. It should  be  noted  however,  that  this
explanation  does not work in the case of the heterodox  programs  where the
foregoing  type  of inertia  is  eliminated  at the  outset.
It can  also  be the  case  that in  various  stages  of the  cycle  the role  of
wages  may change. Thus  for  example,  Bruno  and  Piterman  (1988)  point  out  that
in  the  early  stage  of  the  Israeli  expansionary  phase  real  wages  rose  (after  being
initially  suppressed)  when  unemployment  was  still  r latively  high,  which  supports
the  theory  of  an  expansionary  wage  effect. However,  quite  soon  the  rise  in  real
wages  became  endogenous  to the  expansionary  consumption-pull  forces.
7.  Supply  Side  Effects
Apart  from  the  effects  of  disinflation  on  demand  there  may  be  expansionary
effects  originating  from  the supply  side.  The strong  effect  of exchange  rate
17 This  is  closely  related  to  the  question  of  whether  a real  appreciation
is  expansionary  [see  Krugmnan  and  Taylor  (1978)  and  Lizondo  and  Montiel  (1989)].27
stabilization  on prices,  which  we often  find  in  ERBSs,  may increase  efficiency
through  the reduction  of excessive  variation  in relative  prices  and  through  a
shifting  of resources  out  of excessive  financial  and speculative  activities.
However,  the  latter  effect  operates  only  in  the  longer  run. In  the  medium  run,
the  effect  of restructuring  the  economy  toward  a low-inflation  environment  may
well be  recessionary  [see Garber (1982) for an example from the German
stabilization].
IV.  SPECIFIC  EXPANSIONARY  FACTORS
The forgoing  analysis  dealt  with some general  considerations  which  may
explain  expansionary  tendencies  in  ERBSs. However  in practice  one  may  usually
find  specific  factors  which  contributed  to  the  expansion  of  output  in  individual
cycles. It is conceivable  that  these  factors  were no less  important  (or  even
more important)  in  generating  the  booms  than  the  exchange  rate  policy  itself.
In some  other  cases  it  was the  interaction  of the  exchange  rate stabilization
strategy  with other factors  which  created a  mechanism for unsustainable
expansion.  Since  this  study  involves  a  concrete  set  of  programs  we  have  to take
into  account  these  additional  considerations.
1.  Favorable  External  Conditions
A common  feature  of many ERBSs  is that they started  from a relatively
favorable  external  position. This  could  be due  to an improvement  in terms  of
trade (as  in the Peronist  stabilization),  to a favorable  change  in external
financing  (as  in  the  case  of  Israel),  but  mostly  it  was  a  reOalt  of  prior  efforts
to deal with balance of payments stresses (usually  through recessionary
policies).  The  latter  type  of  development  is  evident  in  the  1980s  in  the  cases28
of  Brazil  and  Mexico  following  the  debt  crisis,  but  it  also  took  place  in  Israel.
In  the  1970s  the  use  of  the  exchange  rate  for  stabilization  in  the  Southern  Cone
began  only  after  the  preceding  external  crises  were  brought  under  control  (Chile
had a  current  account  surplus  in 1976  and  Argentina  had  surpluses  in 1976-78).
The  Frondizi  stabilization  provides  yet  another  example  of this  kind.  On the
other  hand,  we never  observe  that  an  ERBS  began  at a  state  where  the  balance  of
payments  was facing  severe  difficulties.'  The  fact  that  ERBSs  often  take  place
under  relatively  favorable  external  conditions,  following  a  recessiona-y  period,
suggest  the possibility  that the governments  would  have tended,  under these
circumstances,  to  follow  expansionary  policies  even  in  the  absence  of  the  ERBSs.
It is also  conceivable  that  in some  cases,  the  ERBS  was chosen  because  it  was
thought  to  be conducive  to economic  expansion. It is for  this reason  that  we
cannot  say  that  the  cyclical  developments  are  due  entirely  to the  choice  of the
nominal  anchor. However,  the  emergence  of consumption  booms  in  most episodes
provides  indirect  evidence  on the  significance  of the  expectational  mechanism
of the  Calvo-type  theories.
2.  Development  Strategy
It is usually  the  case that  disinflation  is part of a broader  strategy
which  may  involve  expansionary  elements. In  some  cases  these  may  dominate  the
contractionary  policies,  leading  to an expansionary  stage  in the  disinflation
progrdm.  Examples of  this kind are  the  Frondizi and  Krieger Vasena
stabilizations  in Argentina.  In both cases the government  considered  the
modernization  of the  economy  through  investment  as  a dominant  objective.  Thus
Petrecolla  (1989)  writes  that  the  Frondizi  policy  of reducing  inflation  was  part
of  a  strategy  to  accelerate  growth  through  a  substantial  increase  in  investment.29
The reduction  of inflation  and the exchange  rate policy  were considered  as
necessary  in creating  a favorable  atmosphere  for  attracting  foreign  investors
which  were  also  granted special incentives.  The  direct and  indirect
encouragement  of investment  jointly  with exchange  rate  stabilization  were  also
part  of the  Vasena  program. These  considerations  go a long  way in explaining
the  joint  occurrence  of  disinflation  and  expansion  in these  two  programs.
However,  the  liberalization  of the  exchange  rate  and  the  reduced  cost  of
borrowing  abroad  was  an  additional  factor  which  encouraged  investment  (Petrecolla
op.cit.,  p. 118).  Thus  the  Rodriguez  effect  seemed  to  work
simultaneousl  with  more  direct  expansionary  forces  in  a  way  which  is  difficult
to disentangle  empirically.
3.  Opening  The  Capital  Market
The  opening  of  the  economy  to  foreign  capital  was  an integral  part  of  the
reforms  in  the  Southern  Cone  stabilizations.  This  was  not  only  by the  need  to
attract  foreign  capital  but  was also  part of the free  market  philosophy  which
dominated  these  programs.  The removal  of barriers  to capital  flows  can be
considered  as  a  relaxation  of  liquidity  constraints  which may  stimulate
expenditures  directly,  or  as  an  implicit  reduction  in  foreign  interest  rates  (see
discussion  in Edwards (1987)  and Corbo (1985)).  If we  adopt the latter
interpretations  and  incorporate  it  in  a  Rodriguez  (1982)  type  model  we find  again
that  it leads  to a reduction  in the  domestic  real  interest  rate  and  therefore
to  an  overall  expansionary  tendency.  While  the  reduction  in  the  foreign  interest
rate is not equivalent  to a reduction  in the rate of devaluation,  yet it
generates  a similar  cyclical  tendency. Again, it is difficult  to separate30
empirically  the  expansionary  initial  effect  of  these  two  aspects  of  the  Southern
Cone stabilizations.
4.  Commercial  Policies
The  Tablita  policies  in the  Southern  Cone  were  accompanied  by  policies  of
trade  liberalization  (Ramos  (1986),  Ch.  7]. Although  this  was in line  with  the
overall  strategy  of reforms,  the  timing  of the  tariff  reductions  was intended
to  support  the  disinflationary  exchange  rate  policy. It  is  quite  clear  that  this
trade  policy  contributed  to the  increase  in  imports  and to  the  increase  in  the
external  deficit.  But could  it have also contributed  to the upswing  of the
business  cycle? Normally  a  reduction  in  tariffs  will  have  a recessionary  effect
on output  in the short  run  because  of substitution  effects. However,  if the
resulting  worsening  of the  trade  balance  creates  pessimistic  expectations  about
the  fate  of the  stabilization  program  as a  whole  then  the  result  may  well  be a
temporary  rise  in  aggregate  demand  (in  anticipation  of  a  tighter  financial  regime
in the  future).
V.  THE  DOWNSWING
If  we think  of  the  business  cycle  in  terms  of  the  above  models  of  Rodriguez
or  Calvo,  then  the  downswing  is  just  the  counterpart  of  the  upswing  and  therefore
does  not  require  any  special  analysis.  We shall  argue,  however,  that  there  are
important  asymmetries  between these two phases.  In particular,  while the
downward  pressure  on the real  exchange  rate during  the upswing  can be easily
accommodated  by an excess  of inflation  over  announced  devaluation,  the  reverse
process  may  be  hampered  by  inflationary  rigidities  which  result  from  credibility31
considerations.  The  latter  may  render  the  downswing  to  be  much  more  severe  than
otherwise.
The foregoing  approach  to the cycle  refers  to the expectational  aspect
assuming  the  "fundamentals"  are  in  order. We need,  however,  to  examine  to  what
extent  was the downswing  influenced  by a retreat  from the announced  fiscal
policies  which  may involve  a loss  of credibility.  We should  also  recall  that
some  expansions  were influenced  by policies  designed  to encourage  investment.
The downturn  may then be explained  in part by the unsustainability  of these
policies. We also  have  to take  into  account  adverse  external  shocks.
1.  Inflationary  Rigidities  in  the  Downswing
The  Rodriguez  model  describes  the  variation  in  the  real  exchange  rate  and
in  the  real  interest  rate  as a  cycle  in  which  the  reduction  in  the  nominal  rate
of devaluation  is permanent  and fully  credible  whereas  the expected  rate  of
inflation  (of  nontradables)  is gradual,  as a result  of rigidities. Since  the
early  stage  of  the  process  involves  a  real  appreciation,  the  later  stage  requires
a real  devaluation  (given  the  long  run  neutrality  of the  real  exchange  rate).
However,  this  scenario  is  quite  problematic.
Consider  for  example  a  complete  freeze  of  the  nominal  exchange  rate. Then
the real  devaluation  will require  an actual  deflation. However,  since  we are
dealing  with  economies  that  have  experienced  inflation  for  many  years  this  path
will be viewed  with much skepticism. As the real  exchange  rate  continues  to
appreciate the  public will  attach an  increasing probability that  the
overvaluation  will  be corrected  by a  change  in  exchange  rate  policy  rather  than
by a  domestic  deflation  (or  a sharp  cut  in inflation).32
With long  term  nominal  contracts  the  expactation  of future  devaluations
will introduce  a downward  rigidity  in domestic  inflation  which  may  prevent  the
convergence  to  a  low  inflation  equilibrium  within  the  framework  of  the  announced
policy. This  will  be accompanied  by a continued  real  appreciation  and  rise  in
real interest  rates  which  may lead  to a crisis,  as  we observed  in the  Tablita
policies  in the  Southern  Cone.
2.  Reversal  of the  Fiscal  Adjustment
It is often  the  case  that  the  main reason  for  the  abandonment  of the  low
devaluation  regime  in  ERBS  is  the  reversal  of  the  initial  fiscal  policies  which
were supposed  to support  the exchange  rate regime.  Thus in all Argentinean
programs  we find that the abandonment  of the exchange  rate stabilization  is
associated  with a retreat  from  the fiscal  objectives  (in  the Peronist  regime
there  wa3  even  no initial  fiscal  adjustment).  In these  cases  there  is often  a
lag  between  the  fiscal  reversal  and  the  change  in  the  exchange  rate  policy,  since
there is a natural tendency  to postpone  the admission  of the failure  of
stabilization  (the  lag  is  evident  for  example  in  the  Argentinean  Tablita,  as  can
be seen  in Figure  8b).  Clearly,  the  longer  this  lag  the  more severe  will the
recession  tend  to  be.
3.  External  Shocks
In some stabilizations  the  downswing  was aggravated  by adverse  external
shock. For  example,  in  the  Southern  Cone  stabilizations,  the  downturn  coincided
with  an increase  in  oil  prices,  rising  world  interest  rates  and  a tightening  of
the  world  credit  markets. This  may explain  why these  stabilizations  ended  in33
such  explosive  crises  in  the  early  1980s. However,  the  difficulties  in  pursuing
the  Tablita  policies  became  evident  much  before  the  external  shocks.
4.  Unsustainable  Development  Policies
The implication  of the  Rodriguez  model is that the investment  boom is
reversed  because in the expansionary  phase the real interest  rate is below
normal,  a divergence  which  must  be corrected  later. However,  there  might  have
also  been some  basic  difficulties,  at least  in  Argentina,  with the  investment
induced  growth  spans.
In reviewing  the stop-go  policies  in Argentina  in the post war era,
including the Krieger Vasena program Schydlowski  writes: "Rapid in.ernal
expansion  typically  overwhelmed  the  slow  process  of  import  substitution  and  thus
the  demand  for  imports  shot  ahead  of the  availability  of foreign  exchange  from
the  more slowly  growing  exports.... Short  term  borrowing  could  cover  the  gap
for a limited  period  of time,  but ultimately  proved  unsustainable. At that
point,  expansion  would not continue,  devaluation  took place and the economy
entered  into  recession  in order  to ...  build  up foreign  exchange  reserves  once
more".  (op.  cit.,  p. 176). Thus  the  internally  inconsistent  growth  pattern  may
have  interacted  with the  exchange  rate  policy  in  bringing  about  the recession.
VI.  POLICY  ISSUES
The  phenomenon  of the  business  cycle  associated  with ERBSs  does  not in
itself  imply  that the  long  term  disinflation  policy  cannot  persist. This  has
been  shown  in  the  cases  of Chile  and  Israel. However,  even in  these  cases  the
variation  in  economic  activity  and  in consumption  over  time  is undesirable  for
several  reasons.34
First,  it is generally  preferable  to have a stable  path of consumption
[see  Calvo (1986)]. Secondly,  the  excessive  purchases  of capital  goods  which
take  piace  during  the  expansionary  phase (in  anticipation  of a failure  of the
exchange  rate  policy)  lead  to  an  inefficient  allocation  of  investment.  Thirdly,
the  difficulty  in  correcting  the  overvaluation  and  redressing  the  excessive  real
wages  exacerbates  the recessionary  phase  and leads  to an unnecessary  loss  of
output.
In the case of programs  which turn out to be temporary  (this  is the
majority)  there  are  additional  considerations.  In these  cases  the  failure  can
also be reflected  in a destabilization  of the inflationary  process,  as was
clearly  the  case  in the aftermath  of the  Austral  and  Cruzado  plans.  The loss
of credibility  which results  from failure  to stabilize  requires  much more
recessionary  policies  in future  stabilizations  and corresponding  losses  of
output.
This raises  two questions:  Is the stabilization  cycle  unavoidable  in
practice? If  not,  what  can  be done (and  what  was done)  to  mitigate  its  effect?
As for  the  first  question,  the  evidence  from  the  stabilizations  of  Brazil  1964-
67 and  Mexico  1988-89  show  that  the excessive  expansion  can  be avoided. One
possible  explanation  for the  Mexican  case is that the fiscal  adjustment  was
carried out long before 1988.  In fact, the fiscal deficit  was  cut very
drastically  as early  as 1983  and  the  budget  even  showed  an  operational  surplus
in 1987.  This may indicate  that it is advisable  to start  with the fiscal
adjustment  before  the stabilization  of the  exchange  rate in order  to enhance
credibility  in  the  program. It  must  be recognized,  however,  that  this  may  not
be feasible  politically  (in  the  case  of  Mexico  this  step-wise  procedure  was35
facilitated  by the  need to use recessionary  fiscal  measures  to deal  with the
balance  of  payments  crisis). 18
Thus  far  we focused  on policies  which  may  prevent  excessive  expansion  in
stabilization  programs.  However assuming that normally some  form of
overvaluation  will tend to arise in the ERBS one should  look for ways of
overcoming  this  obstacle  which  causes  so  much  difficulties.  An  obvious  question
is  whether  one should  not switch  nominal  anchors  - shifting  at some  stage  from
ERBS  to  MBS - thus  benefitting  from  the  advantages  of  both  strategies.
The ERBS is useful  in the early stage of stopping  inflation  (in the
framework  of a  heterodox  package)  because  it enables  to  clear  the  inflationary
confusion  and  provides  a simple  instrument  by  which the  nominal  policy  can  be
monitored  by the  public. The  initial  fixed  exchange  rate  regime  provides  also
a  simple  framework  for  a stock  adjustment  of  money  without  raising  credibility
problems. Switching  to the  monetary  anchor  some  time  after  the  completion  of
the stock  adjustment  may seem  to be a reasonable  way to avoid  the subsequent
problems  arising  from  exchange  rate  rigidities.
Indeed,  Chile  did quite  well after  abandoning  the fixed  exchange  rate
regime  in  1982  - economic  growth  was  resumed  jointly  with  a  real  devaluation  and
a stable  level  of low  inflation. Israel,  on the  other  hand,  continues  with a
policy  of  infrequent  step  devaluations,  relying  on the  exchange  rate  as  nominal
anchor,  and  going  through  a recession.
There  are  however  two  difficulties  with the  proposed  switch  of anchors.
If the  excessive  real  appreciation  in  the  ERBS is  due  to  lack  of credibility  in
18It should  be pointed  out,  however,  that  the  Mexican  experiment  is still
very young  and  we have to  wait a few  more  years  before  reaching  more definite
conclusions.36
the  adherence  to the  nominal  anchor  then  these  credibility  issues  will  reappear
in connection  with the  money  supply  rule  as  well.
Secondly,  the adoption  of the money supply  policy is problematic  in
disinflation  if the  economy  remains  highly  indexed,  as in the  case  in Israel.
In  this  regime,  monetary  shocks  are  translated  very  easily  to  price  shocks  which
may  undermine  the  credibility  in  price  stability  (given  incomplete  information
about  the  causes  of the  shocks). Chile  overcame  this  difficulty  by abolishing
formal  wage indexation,  a decision  which was facilitated  by the balance  of
payments  crisis  of 1982.  By contrast,  in Israel,  the comfortable  external
position  continues  to support  the  reliance  on the  exchange  rate  as anchor.Table  1.  O,srsctaat;ics  of St"i I;t%;  Pr  l"ald  ;  .
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3rd  Q. 73  Enchang.
Rot
Argentin  3Srd  Q. 70  Fined  Yoe  Unifiod  Fiscal  1.9  2.5  2.7  Incenti,we  for  No  Cradual  27  4  Yun
2nd  Q. 67  (Oreduel)  Eachango  Adjustment  capital  inflame
Rote
2rnail  3rld  Q. 6t  FPoed  */  Yoe  Official  Fiscal  0.9  6.4  4.2  No  NO  Cradual  and  96  3  YTw
2nd Q. 64stop  (Gradual)  adAdjustment  succoessful
Devaluation  Paralll 
Uruguay  lot Q. 72  neaad  Yos  Officibl  Fiscal  4.1  9.5  1.Y  No  Yoe,  C  anntha  Shock  163  C.  Yn




Argentine  2nd  Q. 62  Fined  No  Lnified  Initial  5.7  9.5  1.9  Incentins  for  Yoe  (hf  Cradual  136  1  Yo-
3rd  Q. 59  Eschange  edjuetment  Foreign  Program
Reta  deteriorated  In,estment  a  monthe
lst*r  on  before
*  A shock  usually  includee  O  si-ultoneou*  froox*  of  magma. prices  and  the enchange rats.38
Table 2.  Stages in Southern Cone Disinflation
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Current
GDP Growth  Account  M1
Stage  Dates  per Capita  Export ratio  Growth  Inflation  Daaitikn
Chile
Historic 1950-73  1.5
I  74-76  -4.6  -.12  257  370  435
II  77-81  6.2  -.43  71  50  27
III  82-83  -9.0  -.38  18  19  43
Uruguay
Historic 1950-74  0.6
I  75-78  3.6  -.21  54  59  51
II  79-80  5.3  -.39  67  65  23
III  81-83  -4.8  -.16  13  35  68
Argentina
Historic 1950-75  1.7
I  75-78  -0.9  .19  239  265  190
II  79-80  2.4  -.27  124  148  53
III  81-83  -4.3  -.33  204  204  295
Rest  cf  LA
Historic 1950-74  3.4
I  75-78  2.9
II  79-80  3.8
III  81-83  -2.7
Stage I is the monetary-fiscal stabilization,  stage II is the first (and  main)
part of the exchange rate based stabilization,  and stage III is the collapse.
Dates are annual and therefor  not precise.
Columns (3), (5), (6),  and (7) are annual percentages.
Source:  Ramos (1986),  from various tables.39
Table 3.  Real Lending Ratesa in Southern Cone Stabilizations
Year  Chile  Uruguay  Argentina
1975  127b
1976  18
1977  39  5  16b
1978  35  19  1
1979  17  -10  -2
1980  12  17  6
1981  39  24  19
1982  35  44  11
1983  16  28
a/  Percent, annual.
b/  Second Semester (after  liberalization  of interest rates).
Source:  Ramos (1986),  P. 154.40
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Table 4.  Durables and Non-Durables  Consumption
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
Annual Increase  in Percentage terms (at  constant  prices)
1.  Durables  Purchases  -8.4  37.6  17.9  8.1  -32.0  -1.4  47.1  12.6  2.3
2.  Non-Durable  Consumption  -2.0  7.8  5.9  6.2  -2.6  -0.3  10.2  7.6  3.7
3.  Real Disposable  Income  1.7  14.2  -2.6  2.8  8.7  -10.7  3.4  7.1  5.4
Annual Increase in Prices (Percent)
1.  Durables Purchases  89.3  98.1  102.1  135.5  409.2  297.6  41.1  18.9  9.4
2.  Non-Durable Consumption  133.7  121.8  117.8  146.6  381.4  294.0  47.8  20.2  16.0
Source:  Bank of Israel  Annual Reports41
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